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Administrative Law Judge Upholds FTC
Complaint Ordering Evanston
NorthwesternHealthcare Corporation to
Unwind Five-Year-Old Acquisition
James Lowe and Alexander Krulic

Abstract

On October 21, 2005, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) announced that Administrative Law Judge Stephen J. McGuire had ordered Evanston Northwestern Healthcare Corporation (ENH) to divest Highland Park Hospital, located in a
Chicago suburb. (The decision can be found at http://www.ftc. gov/os/adjpro/d9315/051021idtextversi
pdf.) ENH had acquired Highland Park five years ago for $200 million. In an
administrative complaint issued in February 2004, the FTC alleged that the acquisition had resulted in “substantially lessened competition” and higher prices for
insurers and healthcare consumers for general acute care inpatient services sold to
managed care organizations. In upholding part of the complaint, Judge McGuire
evaluated post-acquisition evidence that ”ENH exercised its enhanced post-merger
market power to obtain price increases significantly above its premerger prices and
substantially larger than price increases obtained by other comparison hospitals.”
(ENH has filed notice that it will appeal the judge’s initial decision to the full
Commission.)
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On October 21, 2005, the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) announced
that Administrative Law Judge Stephen
J. McGuire had ordered Evanston
Northwestern Healthcare Corporation
(ENH) to divest Highland Park Hospital,
located in a Chicago suburb.1 (The
decision can be found at http://www.ftc.
gov/os/adjpro/d9315/051021idtextversion.
pdf.) ENH had acquired Highland
Park ﬁve years ago for $200 million. In
an administrative complaint issued in
February 2004, the FTC alleged that the
acquisition had resulted in “substantially
lessened competition” and higher prices
for insurers and healthcare consumers

for general acute care inpatient services
sold to managed care organizations.2 In
upholding part of the complaint, Judge
McGuire evaluated post-acquisition
evidence that “ENH exercised its
enhanced post-merger market power to
obtain price increases signiﬁcantly above
its premerger prices and substantially
larger than price increases obtained by
other comparison hospitals.”3 (ENH has
ﬁled notice that it will appeal the judge’s
initial decision to the full Commission.)
Judge McGuire’s decision is notable
for two reasons. First, it reverses a
“string of government losses in hospital
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1. In the Matter of Evanston Northwestern Healthcare Corporation and ENH Medical Group, Inc.,
Initial Decision, Oct. 20, 2005, Docket No. 9315, available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9315/
051020initialdecision.pdf. See also, FTC Press Release, Administrative Law Judge Orders Evanston
Northwestern Healthcare Corporation to Sell Highland Park Hospital, Oct. 21, 2005, available at
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2005/10/evanston.htm.
2. In the Matter of Evanston Northwestern Healthcare Corporation and ENH Medical Group, Inc.,
Complaint, Feb. 10, 2004, Docket No. 9315, available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0110234/
040210emhcomplaint.pdf.
3. In the Matter of Evanston Northwestern Healthcare Corporation and ENH Medical Group, Inc.,
Initial Decision, p. 1.
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merger cases over the last decade.”4
Second, and more notably for those
outside the hospital ﬁeld, the decision
is a stark reminder that merging parties
are not immune from antitrust scrutiny
after their deal closes. Under Section
7 of the Clayton Act, the US antitrust
agencies retain authority to investigate
transactions after they close. Indeed,
they retain this authority even when
the agencies had previously cleared the
transaction in the Hart-Scott-Rodino
review process. And the agencies can
seek divestiture of the acquired assets or
other remedies if the merger is found to
have resulted in anticompetitive effects.

I. Hospital Mergers
The government had previously challenged
several hospital mergers based on
arguments about probable anticompetitive
effects, but had lost most of those cases.
By contrast, here, the FTC presented
evidence of actual price increases postmerger. The transaction combined ENH’s
two hospitals in the northern Chicago
suburbs (Evanston and Glenbrook) with
Highland Park Hospital, the nearest
hospital north of them. Judge McGuire
found that as a result of ENH’s acquisition
of Highland Park and elimination of it
as a competitor, ENH increased its rate
structures for managed care organizations
above what any of the hospitals could have
achieved themselves absent the acquisition.

Judge McGuire wrote, “[A]s as soon as
the merger was consummated, [ENH]
began using its enhanced market power
to impose signiﬁcant price increases on
managed care organizations, and ultimately
consumers.”5 Further, he found that ENH
continued unilaterally to raise its rates in
2002 and 2003, such that it “signiﬁcantly
increased the prices paid by managed
care organizations for ENH services.”6
Judge McGuire concluded that the FTC’s
evidence effectively ruled out factors
other than the exercise of market power
as explaining the price increases.7 The
administrative law judge’s decision may
encourage the FTC to bring pre-closing
challenges to future hospital mergers,
despite the Commission’s losing streak
in the courts. The FTC now has a useful
precedent where a decisionmaker found
actual anticompetitive effects based on
post-closing evidence. The Commission
may determine that this precedent (and
empirical evidence about competitive
harm from completed hospital mergers)
will make courts more willing to enjoin
acquisitions than they had been based
on the FTC’s traditional arguments about
likely post-closing competitive effects.

II. A Broader Message
Although the US antitrust agencies
conduct the vast majority of their
reviews of large mergers and acquisitions
prospectively through the Hart-Scott-

4. In the Matter of Evanston Northwestern Healthcare Corporation and ENH Medical Group, Inc.,
Initial Decision, p. 137. In many of those cases, courts found that the government had failed to prove
a relevant geographic market within which the merger would harm competition. Id. at 137-8, citing
Tenet Health Care 186 F.3d at 1053 (characterizing the FTC’s failure to produce sufﬁcient evidence
of a well-deﬁned relevant geographic market as fatal to the government’s claim); Freeman Hosp. 69
F. 3d at 272 (describing the FTC’s failure to meet its burden of establishing the relevant geographic
market as dispositive); Mercy Health Serv., 902 F. Supp. at 987 (“The government has failed to establish
the relevant geographic area and hence has failed to establish that the merger. . . will likely result in
anticompetitive effects.”).
5. Id. at 166.
6. Id. at 1.
7. Id. at 2.
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Rodino (HSR) Premerger Notiﬁcation
process, 8 Judge McGuire’s decision
to force ENH to divest Highland Park
Hospital serves as a reminder that they
can also review transactions post-closing.

decision to challenge the transaction
over a decade after closing. The FTC’s
investigation of ENH, however, appears
to be driven solely by the post-closing
price increases that ENH instituted.

In another post-closing review, the FTC
sued The Hearst Corporation in 2001 for
disgorgement of monopoly proﬁts from
the acquisition by its subsidiary First Data
Bank of Medi-Span. First Data Bank and
Medi-Span owned the two commonly
used drug information databases.
Although the transaction had closed
in 1988, evidence that the combined
entity signiﬁcantly raised prices after the
transaction led the Commission staff
to conduct a post-closing investigation.
The FTC found that the deal created a
monopoly in the sale of drug information
databases, and that First DataBank used
that monopoly power substantially to
increase prices to all database customers.
To settle charges, Hearst ultimately
agreed to disgorge $19 million in proﬁts
and divest the Medi-Span business.9

Other recent examples of post-closing
reviews by the agencies include Chicago
Bridge & Iron and Aspen Technologies. In
October 2001, the FTC ﬁled a complaint
seeking to undo Chicago Bridge & Iron
Company’s February 2001 acquisition of
Pitt-Des Moines, Inc. According to the
FTC’s complaint, the transaction resulted
in a monopoly in markets for LNG
tanks and thermal vacuum chambers. In
addition, the complaint alleged that the
combination created a dominant ﬁrm
in the US markets for LPG tanks and
LIN/LOX/LAR tanks.11 An administrative
law judge held the acquisition unlawful,
and the full Commission upheld the
decision in December 2004.12

Hearst’s troubles were compounded
by the FTC’s ﬁndings that Hearst had
failed to include certain signiﬁcant
4(c) documents in its HSR ﬁling for
the transaction.10 Indeed, this HSR
violation likely contributed to the FTC’s

The Aspen Technologies case involved a
post-closing challenge to an acquisition
that was not reportable under the HSR
Act. In August 2003, the FTC ﬁled an
administrative complaint alleging that
software developer Aspen Technologies’s
May 2002 acquisition of Hyprotech
for $106 million violated the Clayton
Act. The FTC sought divestiture of

8. Pub. L. No. 94-435, 90 Stat. 1383 (1976). The premerger notiﬁcation provisions are in Section 7A
of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 18a.
9. FTC Press Release, Hearst Corp. To Disgorge $19 Million and Divest Business to Facts and
Comparisons to Settle FTC Complaint, Dec. 14, 2001. Available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2001/12/
hearst.htm.
10. Id.
11. In the Matter of Chicago Bridge & Iron Company N.V., Chicago Bridge & Iron Company, and PittDes Moines, Inc., Administrative Complaint, Oct. 25, 2001, FTC File No. 011 0015, Docket No. 9300
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2001/10/chicagobridgeadmincmp.htm.
12. FTC Press Release, Administrative Law Judge Upholds Allegations of Anticompetitive Acquisition
by Chicago Bridge & Iron Company, June 27, 2003, available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2003/06/cbi.
htm. The case is currently on appeal to the 5th Circuit. In re Chicago Bridge & Iron Co., Docket No.
9300, 2004 WL 3118878 (FTC Dec. 21, 2004), petition for review ﬁled (5th Cir. Mar. 10, 2005).
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Hyprotech to restore competition in
the market for engineering simulation
software.13 Aspen eventually agreed to
a consent order requiring divestiture
of certain Hyprotech assets.14
The agencies do not take lightly decisions
to challenge transactions that have already
closed.15 One of the most signiﬁcant
advantages of the HSR Premerger review
process is to reduce the business and
market uncertainties caused by postclosing challenges to transactions.16 It
is both costly and disruptive to force
a company to divest assets that have
been integrated into the operations of
another business. By contrast, under
the HSR process, ﬁrms generally know
before closing whether a particular
transaction will be challenged. They can
then make informed decisions whether
to negotiate a settlement, abandon the
transaction, or litigate.17 As importantly,
the antitrust agencies have an opportunity
to challenge transactions before closing,
after which it will often be difﬁcult or
impossible to impose remedies that
effectively restore competition.
Post-closing investigations generally
begin when customers or competitors
of the merged entity report potential
anticompetitive behavior to one of the
antitrust agencies. The agencies will

then investigate whether there have
been signiﬁcant price increases or other
anticompetitive effects attributable to
the transaction.18 To decide whether to
issue a complaint, the agency determines
whether any anticompetitive effects
resulted from the transaction or whether
they were caused by some exogenous
factor (such as increases in input costs).
In essence, the analysis is whether the
merger, itself, harmed competition.
Unlike with pre-closing investigations, the
agencies have the beneﬁt of hindsight.
Although the US antitrust agencies have
challenged relatively few transactions
post-closing, they have conducted many
more investigations that did not lead to
challenges. Even an investigation that does
not lead the agency to ﬁle a complaint can
be very costly. The agency typically issues
a Conﬁdential Information Demand (CID),
which typically calls for a voluminous
document production and formal
responses to questions that can demand
time and attention from key employees.
Finally, premerger HSR notiﬁcation
does not provide a safe-harbor against
post-closing review. Although the
agencies may be slightly more reticent to
challenge a consummated merger that
they have already reviewed through the
HSR process, their clearance letters to

13. Aspen Technologies, Inc., Administrative Complaint, Dec. 20, 2004, Docket No. 9310 available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/08/aspencmp.pdf.
14. FTC Press Release, FTC Orders Aspen Technology, Inc. to Divest Assets from its 2002 Purchase of
Hyprotech, Jul. 15, 2004, available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2004/07/aspen.htm.
15. See, e.g., William J. Baer, “Reﬂections on 20 Years of Merger Enforcement under the Hart-ScottRodino Act,” Prepared Remarks before The Conference Board, Oct. 29, 1996 at fn 58.
16. Congress intended the HSR Act to alleviate the inefﬁciency of post-merger review. See FTC v. H.J.
Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708, 726 (D.C. Cir. 2001), citing 119 Cong. Rec. 36612 (1973).
17. Id.
18. See, e.g., In the Matter of Chicago Bridge & Iron Company, Administrative Complaint, cited supra;
Aspen Technologies, Inc., Complaint, Dec. 20, 2004, Docket No. 9310, available at http://www.ftc.gov/
os/2003/08/aspencmp.pdf; MSC Software Corp., Complaint, Aug. 14, 2002, Docket No. 9299 available
at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/11/mscdo.pdf.
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merging parties on completion of HSR
review are only a statement of present
intention not to challenge the proposed
transaction. The agencies reserve the
right to revisit the decision if post-merger
evidence suggests that the combined
ﬁrm has exercised market power as a
result of the transaction.19 Whether
they do so will generally turn on factors
such as the quantum of anticompetitive
effects from the transaction, the number
and force of complaints, and whether
there is an available remedy that is
likely to restore lost competition.
In addition, it is possible for states to
challenge closed transactions under
their own or federal law and for private
parties to bring suits post-closing
under Section 7 or analogous state
laws. Although challenges by state
authorities have been rarer in recent
years, private challenges to mergers

This letter is for general informational purposes only
and does not represent our legal advice as to any
particular set of facts, nor does this letter represent
any undertaking to keep recipients advised as to all
relevant legal developments.

have been more common (but such
challenges have rarely been successful).

Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP is
a Delaware limited liability partnership. Our
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Delaware limited liability partnership.

The Evanston Northwestern Healthcare
case stands as a reminder not to confuse
the closing of a transaction with an
exemption from further antitrust scrutiny.
Merging parties should be cognizant that
sharply raising prices or other post-closing
conduct that may agitate consumers or
other market participants can create
risks of a burdensome and expensive
antitrust investigation as well as unwinding
of the transaction and other remedies.
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19. The Clayton Antitrust Act also permits private challenges mergers that violate Section 7, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 12 et seq. (1914).
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